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S
ince the financial crisis began in mid-2007, media
sources and academics alike have scrutinized data
from the banking sector to understand how lending
to consumers and firms has changed. The graph shows
total loans and leases by commercial banks and their com-
ponents: real estate loans, individual loans, commercial and
industrial loans, and other loans. This measure is part of
the H.8 data, which provide weekly aggregate balance
sheet data for commercial banks with a charter in the
United States.1
If considered over the past three decades, the series
appears approximately on trend but slightly erratic during
the current recession; total loans and leases remains fairly
constant until the end of 2008:Q3, when it increases sharply
and then declines.
If our goal is to understand changes in lending dynamics,
particularly over the past few quarters,
do the graph series imply that commer-
cial bank lending increased in the last few
months of 2008 and then bank lending
to the public contracted? Not quite.
Several reasons suggest reading such
data with extreme care.2
First, existing loans and leases at each
point in time are equilibrium quantities
that depend on the interaction between
the supply and demand of credit. Whether
the observed decrease in the series is
caused by banks restricting their lending
or by borrowers demanding less credit
during a major recession remains unclear.
Second, commercial banks are respon-
sible for only a fraction (about 35 percent)
of financial intermediation in the U.S.
economy.3 The H.8 release does not
include the loans of other intermediaries
(thrifts and non-depository institutions);
therefore, just because we do not observe
a large contraction in this volume of total loans and leases
does not mean that a contraction in the overall economy
has not occurred. In fact, evidence suggests that other credit
markets have been severely strained.4
Third, since the onset of the crisis, several financial
services companies and thrifts that made loans to con-
sumers and firms (but whose loans were not included in
the H.8 release) have either become commercial banks or
have been acquired by commercial banks. When a com-
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Mar-08mercial bank acquires a thrift, an insurance company, or
another financial firm, the loans of the target (acquired)
company suddenly appear as additional commercial bank
loans even though no real change in credit took place in
the economy. Many such transactions have occurred since
the crisis began, creating an upward shift to the series that
cannot be interpreted as an increase in lending. (Take, for
example the acquisition of the banking operations of
Washington Mutual by JPMorgan Chase on September 25,
2008.)
Fourth, evidence indicates that firms and individuals
are taking advantage of their previously unused (but com-
mitted) bank credit lines, just as they did in previous periods
of credit contraction.5 If banks grant only a handful of new
loans but borrowers continue to draw from existing lines of
credit available at commercial banks, the end result would
appear to be an increase in lending. At the same time,
commercial banks may be withdrawing part of their com-
mitments, which would not be recorded in balance sheet
and H.8 data.
Finally, this series may be affected by the programs
implemented by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve (for
example, the Troubled Asset Relief Program or the Term
Auction Facility), and may have been very different without
these interventions.
These caveats indicate that caution is necessary when
making inferences based solely on aggregate loans data. ￿
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